A reconnaissance was made on
the afternoon of the 31st by General Gough, accompanied by Colonel
Chapman. He penetrated to within a short distance of the village of Pir
Paimal, where it was ascertained that the enemy were strongly entrenched,
and where several guns were unmasked. A great deal of valuable
information was obtained before the enemy began to interfere with the
leisurely withdrawal. The cavalry suffered little, but the Sikh infantry
covering the retirement of the reconnaissance were hard pressed by great
masses of Afghan regulars and irregulars. So boldly did the enemy come on
that the third and part of the first brigade came into action, and the
firing did not cease until the evening. The enemy were clearly in the
belief that the reconnaissance was an advance in force which they had
been able to check and indeed drive in, and they were opportunely
audacious in the misapprehension that they had gained a success. The
information brought in decided the General to attack on the following
morning; and having matured his dispositions, he explained them
personally to the commanding officers in the early morning of September
1st. The plan of attack was perfectly simple. The Babawali Kotul was to
be plied with a brisk cannonade and threatened by demonstrations both of
cavalry and infantry; while the first and second brigades, with the third
in reserve, were to turn the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill, force the
enemy's right in the interval between that hill and the Kharoti eminence,
take in reverse the Babawali Kotul, and pressing on up the Urgundab
valley, carry Ayoub Khan's principal camp at Mazra.
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