But
Abdurrahman had come to know himself strong enough to reduce to order
that legacy of chaos if it should be left; and in view of his future
relations with his fellow Afghans he was not solicitous to be beholden to
the foreigners to any embarrassing extent. He knew, too, the wisdom of
'masterly inactivity' in delicate conditions. And, again, he had no
confidence in our pledges. On the 4th of August, the day after the
meeting between him and Mr Griffin at Zimma, the latter wrote: 'They
(Abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our intention was to rid
ourselves of a formidable opponent, and dreaded that if he had come
straight into Cabul he would have been arrested, and deported to India.'
A Liberal Government was now in office in England, and was urgent for the
speedy evacuation of Afghanistan. Lord Lytton had resigned and had been
succeeded as Viceroy by the Marquis of Ripon. Lieutenant-General Sir
Donald Stewart was in chief command at Cabul. A great number of letters
from Abdurrahman to chiefs and influential persons throughout Afghanistan
were being intercepted, the tone of which was considered objectionable.
He was reported to be in close correspondence with Mahomed Jan, who had
never ceased to be our bitter enemy. The fact that negotiations were in
progress between the British Government and Abdurrahman had become matter
of general knowledge throughout the country, and was occasioning
disquietude and excitement.
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