Was it likely that they would scatter
resignedly, leaving untouched the rich booty of the city that had been
almost within arm's-length as they looked down on it from the peak of the
Takht-i-Shah, and whose minarets they were within sight of on the spur
and in the villages of Beni-Hissar? Was that ever likely? And was it not
made more and yet more unlikely when on the afternoon of the 13th
Macpherson, acting on orders, moved his camp to the Balla Hissar heights,
evacuating Deh Mazung and leaving open to the enemy the road into the
city through the Cabul gorge? The following morning was to show how
promptly and how freely the Afghans had taken advantage of the access to
the capital thus afforded them. It must never be forgotten that at this
time our people in Afghanistan held no more territory than the actual
ground they stood upon and the terrain swept by their fire. No
trustworthy intelligence from outside that region was procurable; and of
this there can be no clearer evidence than that the General was under the
belief that the enemy had been 'foiled in their western and southern
operations.'
The morning of the 14th effectually dispelled the optimistic
anticipations indulged in overnight. At daybreak a large body of Afghans,
with many standards, were discerned on a hill about a mile northward of
the Asmai ridge, from which and from the Kohistan road they were moving
on to the crest of that ridge.
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