Roberts might have been assailed with better chance of
success when his force was dispersed between the Siah Sung camp, the
Balla Hissar, and Sherpur, than when concentrated in the strong defensive
position against which the Afghans beat in vain. Perhaps the rising
ripened faster in 1879 than in 1841 because in the former period no
Macnaghten fomented intrigues and scattered gold. Perhaps Shere Ali's
military innovations may have instilled into the masses of his time some
rough lessons in the art and practice of speedy mobilisation. The
crowning disgrace of 1842 was that a trained army of regular soldiers
should have been annihilated by a few thousand hillmen, among whom there
was no symptom either of real valour or of good leadership. To Roberts
and his force attaches the credit of having defeated the persistent and
desperate efforts of levies at least ten times superior in numbers, well
armed, far from undisciplined, courageous beyond all experience of Afghan
nature, and under the guidance of a leader who had some conception of
strategy, and who certainly was no mean tactician.
In the Afghan idiosyncrasy there is a considerable strain of practical
philosophy. The blood of the massacred mission was not dry when it was
recognised in Cabul that stern retribution would inevitably follow. Well,
said the Afghans among themselves, what must be must be, for they are all
fatalists.
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