?– Higher-level security protocols in internal EPON data transactions (between ONU
and OLT) have also been proposed, though such a proposal has obvious shortcomings:
in order to assure full system interoperability, a single security mechanism
would have to be selected and agreed upon for implementation; additionally, ONUs
and OLTs would need to inherently become IP packet routers, operating at protocol
stack Layer 3 and above, and thus limiting Ethernet versatility while not preventing
such simple forms of attacks as data mining, passive monitoring, and so on,
which can be avoided if a strict link-layer security mechanism is employed.
In order to avoid most common problems with server overload, transition problems,
system interoperability, security threats, and lack of data privacy, it is necessary
to make PONs, and EPONs specifically, immune to most common types of security
breaches, including passive monitoring, data mining, masquerading, ToS, and certain
variants of DoS or distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. Hardware-level attacks cannot
be avoided without introducing a dynamic wavelength management system, which is
currently both expensive and unwieldy.
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