As regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a
federal government, the provision of the American Constitution seems
exceedingly judicious, that Congress should consist of two Houses, and
that while one of them is constituted according to population, each
State being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number
of its inhabitants, the other should represent not the citizens, but
the State Governments, and every State, whether large or small, should
be represented in it by the same number of members. This provision
precludes any undue power from being exercised by the more powerful
States over the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the
State Governments, by making it impossible, as far as the mode of
representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress
unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, but by a
majority of the States. I have before adverted to the further
incidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of
qualifications in one of the Houses. Being nominated by select bodies,
the Legislatures of the various States, whose choice, for reasons
already indicated, is more likely to fall on eminent men than any
popular election- who have not only the power of electing such, but a
strong motive to do so, because the influence of their State in the
general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal
weight and abilities of its representatives; the Senate of the
United States, thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the
political men of established and high reputation in the Union: while
the Lower House of Congress has, in the opinion of competent
observers, been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous
personal merit as the Upper House for its presence.
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