Yet this is the only federation which seems possible among
monarchical states. A king, who holds his power by inheritance, not by
delegation, and who cannot be deprived of it, nor made responsible
to any one for its use, is not likely to renounce having a separate
army, or to brook the exercise of sovereign authority over his own
subjects, not through him but directly, by another power. To enable
two or more countries under kingly government to be joined together in
an effectual confederation it seems necessary that they should all
be under the same king. England and Scotland were a federation of this
description during the interval of about a century between the union
of the Crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even this was effective,
not through federal institutions, for none existed, but because the
regal power in both Constitutions was during the greater part of
that time so nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both
to be shaped according to a single will.
Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of
each particular State owes obedience to two Governments, that of his
own state and that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not
only that the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be
precisely and clearly defined, but that the power to decide between
them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the
Governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire
independent of both.
Pages:
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352