A second condition of the stability of a federal government is
that the separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely, for
protection against foreign encroachment, on their individual strength.
If they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union
with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own
liberty of action; and consequently, whenever the policy of the
Confederation, in things reserved to its cognisance, is different from
that which any one of its members would separately pursue, the
internal and sectional breach will, through absence of sufficient
anxiety to preserve the union, be in danger of going so far as to
dissolve it.
A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that
there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several
contracting states. They cannot, indeed, be exactly equal in
resources: in all federations there will be a gradation of power among
the members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilised than
others. There is a wide difference in wealth and population between
New York and Rhode Island; between Bern and Zug or Glaris. The
essential is, that there should not be any one State so much more
powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many
of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist
on being master of the joint deliberations: if there be two, they will
be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ everything
will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.
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