The electors have not to award something which either candidate
has a right to, nor to pass judgment on the general merits of the
competitors, but to declare which of them has most of their personal
confidence, or best represents their political convictions. A judge is
bound to treat his political friend, or the person best known to
him, exactly as he treats other people; but it would be a breach of
duty as well as an absurdity if an elector did so. No argument can
be grounded on the beneficial effect produced on judges, as on all
other functionaries, by the moral jurisdiction of opinion; for even in
this respect, that which really exercises a useful control over the
proceedings of a judge, when fit for the judicial office, is not
(except sometimes in political cases) the opinion of the community
generally, but that of the only public by whom his conduct or
qualifications can be duly estimated, the bar of his own court.
I must not be understood to say that the participation of the
general public in the administration of justice is of no importance;
it is of the greatest: but in what manner? By the actual discharge
of a part of the judicial office, in the capacity of jurymen. This
is one of the few cases in politics in which it is better that the
people should act directly and personally than through their
representatives; being almost the only case in which the errors that a
person exercising authority may commit can be better borne than the
consequences of making him responsible for them.
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