It is far from desirable that there
should be no means of getting rid of a bad or incompetent judge,
unless for such misconduct as he can be made to answer for in a
criminal court; and that a functionary on whom so much depends
should have the feeling of being free from responsibility except to
opinion and his own conscience. The question however is, whether in
the peculiar position of a judge, and supposing that all practicable
securities have been taken for an honest appointment,
irresponsibility, except to his own and the public conscience, has not
on the whole less tendency to pervert his conduct than
responsibility to the government, or to a popular vote. Experience has
long decided this point in the affirmative as regards responsibility
to the executive; and the case is quite equally strong when the
responsibility sought to be enforced is to the suffrages of
electors. Among the good qualities of a popular constituency, those
peculiarly incumbent upon a judge, calmness and impartiality, are
not numbered. Happily, in that intervention of popular suffrage
which is essential to freedom they are not the qualities required.
Even the quality of justice, though necessary to all human beings, and
therefore to all electors, is not the inducement which decides any
popular election. Justice and impartiality are as little wanted for
electing a member of Parliament as they can be in any transaction of
men.
Pages:
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299