I will not affirm that it would at all times and places be desirable
that the head of the executive should be so completely dependent
upon the votes of a representative assembly as the Prime Minister is
in England, and is without inconvenience. If it were thought best to
avoid this, he might, though appointed by Parliament, hold his
office for a fixed period, independent of a parliamentary vote:
which would be the American system, minus the popular election and its
evils. There is another mode of giving the head of the
administration as much independence of the legislature as is at all
compatible with the essentials of free government. He never could be
unduly dependent on a vote of Parliament, if he had, as the British
Prime Minister practically has, the power to dissolve the House and
appeal to the people: if instead of being turned out of office by a
hostile vote, he could only be reduced by it to the alternative of
resignation or dissolution. The power of dissolving Parliament is
one which I think it desirable he should possess, even under the
system by which his own tenure of office is secured to him for a fixed
period. There ought not to be any possibility of that deadlock in
politics which would ensue on a quarrel breaking out between a
President and an Assembly, neither of whom, during an interval which
might amount to years, would have any legal means of ridding itself of
the other.
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