These conditions evidently are
not found in a body constituted in the manner of our House of Lords.
So soon as conventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe
the democracy, a House of Lords becomes insignificant.
Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to
moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be
constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman
Senate, itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that
ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic
assembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of
the public itself, want of special training and knowledge. The
appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body of which special
training and knowledge should be the characteristics. If one House
represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit,
tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by
practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should
be the Chamber of Statesmen; a council composed of all living public
men who have passed through important political offices or
employments. Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a
merely moderating body. It would not be exclusively a check, but
also an impelling force. In its hands the power of holding the
people back would be vested in those most competent, and who would
generally be most inclined, to lead them forward in any right
course.
Pages:
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279