The practicability of any real check to the ascendancy of the
majority depends henceforth on the distribution of strength in the
most popular branch of the governing body; and I have indicated the
mode in which, to the best of my judgment, a balance of forces might
most advantageously be established there. I have also pointed out,
that even if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise
complete predominance by means of a corresponding majority in
Parliament, yet if minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal
right due to them on strictly democratic principles, of being
represented proportionally to their numbers, this provision will
ensure the perpetual presence in the House by the same popular title
as its other members, of so many of the first intellects in the
country, that without being in any way banded apart, or invested
with any invidious prerogative, this portion of the national
representation will have a personal weight much more than in
proportion to its numerical strength, and will afford, in a most
effective form, the moral centre of resistance which is needed. A
Second Chamber, therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would
not contribute to it, but might even, in some conceivable modes impede
its attainment. If, however, for the other reasons already
mentioned, the decision were taken that there should be such a
Chamber, it is desirable that it should be composed of elements which,
without being open to the imputation of class interests adverse to the
majority, would incline it to oppose itself to the class interests
of the majority, and qualify it to raise its voice with authority
against their errors and weaknesses.
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