The consideration which tells most, in my judgment,
in favour of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment)
is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power,
whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having
only themselves to consult. It is important that no set of persons
should, in great affairs, be able, even temporarily, to make their sic
volo prevail without asking any one else for his consent. A majority
in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character- when
composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always
assured of victory in their own House- easily becomes despotic and
overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its
acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same
reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes it desirable
there should be two Chambers: that neither of them may be exposed to
the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of a
single year. One of the most indispensable requisites in the practical
conduct of politics, especially in the management of free
institutions, is conciliation: a readiness to compromise; a
willingness to concede something to opponents, and to shape good
measures so as to be as little offensive as possible to persons of
opposite views; and of this salutary habit, the mutual give and take
(as it has been called) between two Houses is a perpetual school;
useful as such even now, and its utility would probably be even more
felt in a more democratic constitution of the Legislature.
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