It is true that the necessity of
obtaining the consent of both to the passing of any measure may at
times be a material obstacle to improvement, since, assuming both
the Houses to be representative, and equal in their numbers, a
number slightly exceeding a fourth of the entire representation may
prevent the passing of a Bill; while, if there is but one House, a
Bill is secure of passing if it has a bare majority. But the case
supposed is rather abstractedly possible than likely to occur in
practice. It will not often happen that of two Houses similarly
composed, one will be almost unanimous, and the other nearly equally
divided: if a majority in one rejects a measure, there will
generally have been a large minority unfavourable to it in the
other; any improvement, therefore, which could be thus impeded,
would in almost all cases be one which had not much more than a simple
majority in the entire body, and the worst consequence that could
ensue would be to delay for a short time the passing of the measure,
or give rise to a fresh appeal to the electors to ascertain if the
small majority in Parliament corresponded to an effective one in the
country. The inconvenience of delay, and the advantages of the
appeal to the nation, might be regarded in this case as about
equally balanced.
I attach little weight to the argument oftenest urged for having two
Chambers- to prevent precipitancy, and compel a second deliberation;
for it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly in which
the established forms of business do not require many more than two
deliberations.
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