The question of pledges is not one
of those which vitally concern the existence of representative
governments; but it is very material to their beneficial operation.
The laws cannot prescribe to the electors the principles by which they
shall direct their choice; but it makes a great practical difference
by what principles they think they ought to direct it. And the whole
of that great question is involved in the inquiry whether they
should make it a condition that the representative shall adhere to
certain opinions laid down for him by his constituents.
No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion, as to this
matter, results from the general principles which it professes. We
have from the first affirmed, and unveryingly kept in view, the
co-equal importance of two great requisites of government:
responsibility to those for whose benefit political power ought to be,
and always professes to be, employed; and jointly therewith to obtain,
in the greatest measure possible, for the function of government the
benefits of superior intellect, trained by long meditation and
practical discipline to that special task. If this second purpose is
worth attaining, it is worth the necessary price. Superior powers of
mind and profound study are of no use if they do not sometimes lead
a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by
ordinary powers of mind without study: and if it be an object to
possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to
average electors, it must be counted upon that the representative will
sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and
that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest right of the
two.
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