By
refusing to elect any one who will not pledge himself to all their
opinions, and even, if they please, to consult with them before voting
on any important subject not foreseen, they can reduce their
representative to their mere mouthpiece, or compel him in honour, when
no longer willing to act in that capacity, to resign his seat. And
since they have the power of doing this, the theory of the
Constitution ought to suppose that they will wish to do it; since
the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be
assumed that political power will be abused to promote the
particular purposes of the holder; not because it always is so, but
because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which
is the especial use of free institutions. However wrong, therefore, or
however foolish, we may think it in the electors to convert their
representative into a delegate, that stretch of the electoral
privilege being a natural and not improbable one, the same precautions
ought to be taken as if it were certain. We may hope that the electors
will not act on this notion of the use of the suffrage; but a
representative government needs to be so framed that, even if they do,
they shall not be able to effect what ought not to be in the power
of any body of persons- class legislation for their own benefit.
When it is said that the question is only one of political morality,
this does not extenuate its importance.
Pages:
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259