In this and most other countries which
possess representative constitutions, law and custom warrant a
member of Parliament in voting according to his opinion of right,
however different from that of his constituents: but there is a
floating notion of the opposite kind, which has considerable practical
operation on many minds, even of members of Parliament, and often
makes them, independently of desire for popularity, or concern for
their re-election, feel bound in conscience to let their conduct, on
questions on which their constituents have a decided opinion, be the
expression of that opinion rather than of their own. Abstractedly from
positive law, and from the historical traditions of any particular
people, which of these notions of the duty of a representative is
the true one?
Unlike the questions which we have hitherto treated, this is not a
question of constitutional legislation, but of what may more
properly be called constitutional morality- the ethics of
representative government. It does not so much concern institutions,
as the temper of mind which the electors ought to bring to the
discharge of their functions; the ideas which should prevail as to the
moral duties of an elector. For let the system of representation be
what it may, it will be converted into one of mere delegation if the
electors so choose. As long as they are free not to vote, and free
to vote as they like, they cannot be prevented from making their
vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex to it.
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