A great number of the
electors will have two sets of preferences- those on private and
those on public grounds. The last are the only ones which the
elector would like to avow. The best side of their character is that
which people are anxious to show, even to those who are no better than
themselves. People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre,
from malice, from pique, from personal rivalry, even from the
interests or prejudices of class or sect, more readily in secret than
in public. And cases exist- they may come to be more frequent- in
which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves consists
in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an honest minority. In
such a case as that of the repudiating States of North America, is
there not some check to the unprincipled voter in the shame of looking
an honest man in the face? Since all this good would be sacrificed
by the ballot, even in the circumstances most favourable to it, a much
stronger case is requisite than can now be made out for its
necessity (and the case is continually becoming still weaker) to
make its adoption desirable."*
* Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform, 2nd ed. pp 32-36.
On the other debateable points connected with the mode of voting
it is not necessary to expend so many words. The system of personal
representation, as organised by Mr. Hare, renders necessary the
employment of voting papers.
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