His vote is not
a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his
personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly a matter
of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and most
conscientious opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other idea
of it is unfit to have the suffrage; its effect on him is to
pervert, not to elevate his mind. Instead of opening his heart to an
exalted patriotism and the obligation of public duty, it awakens and
nourishes in him the disposition to use a public function for his
own interest, pleasure, or caprice; the same feelings and purposes, on
a humbler scale, which actuate a despot and oppressor. Now an ordinary
citizen in any public position, or on whom there devolves any social
function, is certain to think and feel, respecting the obligations
it imposes on him, exactly what society appears to think and feel in
conferring it. What seems to be expected from him by society forms a
standard which he may fall below, but which he will seldom rise above.
And the interpretation which he is almost sure to put upon secret
voting is that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference
to those who are not allowed to know how he gives it; but may bestow
it simply as he feels inclined.
This is the decisive reason why the argument does not hold, from the
use of the ballot in clubs and private societies, to its adoption in
parliamentary elections.
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