The evil would be exactly proportional to the amount of
discretion left to the chosen electors. The only case in which they
would probably be afraid to employ their vote for the promotion of
their personal interest would be when they were elected under an
express pledge, as mere delegates, to carry, as it were, the votes
of their constituents to the hustings. The moment the double stage
of election began to have any effect, it would begin to have a bad
effect. And this we shall find true of the principle of indirect
election however applied, except in circumstances similar to those
of the election of Senators in the United States.
The best which could be said for this political contrivance that
in some states of opinion it might be a more practicable expedient
than that of plural voting for giving to every member of the community
a vote of some sort, without rendering the mere numerical majority
predominant in Parliament: as, for instance, if the present
constituency of this country were increased by the addition of a
numerous and select portion of the labouring classes, elected by the
remainder. Circumstances might render such a scheme a convenient
mode of temporary compromise, but it does not carry out any
principle sufficiently thoroughly to be likely to recommend itself
to any class of thinkers as a permanent arrangement.
Chapter 10
Of the Mode of Voting.
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