The mere fact that it is an additional and superfluous wheel in the
machinery is no trifling objection. Its decided inferiority as a means
of cultivating public spirit and political intelligence has already
been dwelt upon: and if it had any effective operation at all- that
is, if the primary electors did to any extent leave to their nominees
the selection of their parliamentary representative- the voter would
be prevented from identifying himself with his member of Parliament,
and the member would feel a much less active sense of responsibility
to his constituents. In addition to all this, the comparatively
small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a
member of Parliament would reside, could not but afford great
additional facilities to intrigue, and to every form of corruption
compatible with the station in life of the electors. The
constituencies would universally be reduced, in point of
conveniences for bribery, to the condition of the small boroughs at
present. It would be sufficient to gain over a small number of persons
to be certain of being returned. If it be said that the electors would
be responsible to those who elected them, the answer is obvious, that,
holding no permanent office, or position in the public eye, they would
risk nothing by a corrupt vote except what they would care little for,
not to be appointed electors again: and the main reliance must still
be on the penalties for bribery, the insufficiency of which
reliance, in small constituencies, experience has made notorious to
all the world.
Pages:
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226