In the next place, admitting that a person who, from his narrow
range of cultivation, cannot judge well of the qualifications of a
candidate for parliament may be a sufficient judge of the honesty
and general capacity of somebody whom he may depute to choose a member
of Parliament for him; I may remark, that if the voter acquiesces in
this estimate of his capabilities, and really wishes to have the
choice made for him by a person in whom he places reliance, there is
no need of any constitutional provision for the purpose; he has only
to ask this confidential person privately what candidate he had better
vote for. In that case the two modes of election coincide in their
result, and every advantage of indirect election is obtained under
direct. The systems only diverge in their operation, if we suppose
that the voter would prefer to use his own judgment in the choice of a
representative, and only lets another choose for him because the law
does not allow him a more direct mode of action. But if this be his
state of mind; if his will does not go along with the limitation which
the law imposes, and he desires to make a direct choice, he can do
so notwithstanding the law. He has only to choose as elector a known
partisan of the candidate he prefers, or some one who will pledge
himself to vote for that candidate. And this is so much the natural
working of election by two stages that, except in a condition of
complete political indifference, it can scarcely be expected to act
otherwise.
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