This plan
of filtering, as it were, the popular suffrage through an intermediate
body admits of a very plausible defence; since it may be said, with
great appearance of reason, that less intellect and instruction are
required for judging who among our neighbours can be most safely
trusted to choose a member of parliament, than who is himself
fittest to be one.
In the first place, however, if the dangers incident to popular
power may be thought to be in some degree lessened by this indirect
arrangement, so also are its benefits; and the latter effect is much
more certain than the former. To enable the system to work as desired,
it must be carried into effect in the spirit in which it is planned;
the electors must use the suffrage in the manner supposed by the
theory, that is, each of them must not ask himself who the member of
parliament should be, but only whom he would best like to choose one
for him. It is evident that the advantages which indirect is
supposed to have over direct election require this disposition of mind
in the voter, and will only be realised by his taking the doctrine
au serieux, that his sole business is to choose the choosers, not
the member himself. The supposition must be, that he will not occupy
his thoughts with political opinions and measures, or political men,
but will be guided by his personal respect for some private
individual, to whom he will give a general power of attorney to act
for him.
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