When two persons who have a joint interest in
any business differ in opinion, does justice require that both
opinions should be held of exactly equal value? If, with equal virtue,
one is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence- or if,
with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue- the opinion,
the judgment, of the higher moral or intellectual being is worth more
than that of the inferior: and if the institutions of the country
virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing
which is not. One of the two, as the wiser or better man, has a claim
to superior weight: the difficulty is in ascertaining which of the two
it is; a thing impossible as between individuals, but, taking men in
bodies and in numbers, it can be done with a certain approach to
accuracy. There would be no pretence for applying this doctrine to any
case which could with reason be considered as one of individual and
private right. In an affair which concerns only one of two persons,
that one is entitled to follow his own opinion, however much wiser the
other may be than himself. But we are speaking of things which equally
concern them both; where, if the more ignorant does not yield his
share of the matter to the guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man
must resign his to that of the more ignorant. Which of these modes
of getting over the difficulty is most for the interest of both, and
most conformable to the general fitness of things? If it be deemed
unjust that either should have to give way, which injustice is
greatest? that the better judgment should give way to the worse, or
the worse to the better?
Now, national affairs are exactly such a joint concern, with the
difference, that no one needs ever be called upon for a complete
sacrifice of his own opinion.
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