But even in this democracy, absolute power, if they chose to
exercise it, would rest with the numerical majority; and these would
be composed exclusively of a single class, alike in biasses,
prepossessions, and general modes of thinking, and a class, to say
no more, not the most highly cultivated. The constitution would
therefore still be liable to the characteristic evils of class
government: in a far less degree, assuredly, than that exclusive
government by a class, which now usurps the name of democracy; but
still, under no effective restraint, except what might be found in the
good sense, moderation, and forbearance of the class itself. If checks
of this description are sufficient, the philosophy of constitutional
government is but solemn trifling. All trust in constitutions is
grounded on the assurance they may afford, not that the depositaries
of power will not, but that they cannot, misemploy it. Democracy is
not the ideally best form of government unless this weak side of it
can be strengthened; unless it can be so organised that no class,
not even the most numerous, shall be able to reduce all but itself
to political insignificance, and direct the course of legislation
and administration by its exclusive class interest. The problem is, to
find the means of preventing this abuse, without sacrificing the
characteristic advantages of popular government.
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