He may extend his list to a greater number, in the order of
his preference, so that if the names which stand near the top of the
list either cannot make up the quota, or are able to make it up
without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it
may assist in returning. To obtain the full number of members required
to complete the House, as well as to prevent very popular candidates
from engrossing nearly all the suffrages, it is necessary, however
many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota
should be counted for his return: the remainder of those who voted for
him would have their votes counted for the next person on their
respective lists who needed them, and could by their aid complete
the quota. To determine which of a candidate's votes should be used
for his return, and which set free for others, several methods are
proposed, into which we shall not here enter. He would of course
retain the votes of all those who would not otherwise be
represented; and for the remainder, drawing lots, in default of
better, would be an unobjectionable expedient. The voting papers would
be conveyed to a central office; where the votes would be counted, the
number of first, second, third, and other votes given for each
candidate ascertained, and the quota would be allotted to every one
who could make it up, until the number of the House was complete:
first votes being preferred to second, second to third, and so
forth.
Pages:
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165