No one would wish that this body
should of itself have any power of enacting laws: the Commission would
only embody the element of intelligence in their construction;
Parliament would represent that of will. No measure would become a law
until expressly sanctioned by Parliament: and Parliament, or either
House, would have the power not only of rejecting but of sending
back a Bill to the Commission for reconsideration or improvement.
Either House might also exercise its initiative, by referring any
subject to the Commission, with directions to prepare a law. The
Commission, of course, would have no power of refusing its
instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired.
Instructions, concurred in by both Houses, to draw up a Bill which
should effect a particular purpose, would be imperative on the
Commissioners, unless they preferred to resign their office. Once
framed, however, Parliament should have no power to alter the measure,
but solely to pass or reject it; or, if partially disapproved of,
remit it to the Commission for reconsideration. The Commissioners
should be appointed by the Crown, but should hold their offices for
a time certain, say five years, unless removed on an address from
the two Houses of Parliament, grounded either on personal misconduct
(as in the case of judges), or on refusal to draw up a Bill in
obedience to the demands of Parliament.
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