It has never been thought desirable that Parliament should itself
nominate even the members of a Cabinet. It is enough that it virtually
decides who shall be prime minister, or who shall be the two or
three individuals from whom the prime minister shall be chosen. In
doing this it merely recognises the fact that a certain person is
the candidate of the party whose general policy commands its
support. In reality, the only thing which Parliament decides is, which
of two, or at most three, parties or bodies of men, shall furnish
the executive government: the opinion of the party itself decides
which of its members is fittest to be placed at the head. According to
the existing practice of the British Constitution, these things seem
to be on as good a footing as they can be. Parliament does not
nominate any minister, but the Crown appoints the head of the
administration in conformity to the general wishes and inclinations
manifested by Parliament, and the other ministers on the
recommendation of the chief; while every minister has the undivided
moral responsibility of appointing fit persons to the other offices of
administration which are not permanent. In a republic, some other
arrangement would be necessary: but the nearer it approached in
practice to that which has long existed in England, the more likely it
would be to work well. Either, as in the American republic, the head
of the Executive must be elected by some agency entirely independent
of the representative body; or the body must content itself with
naming the prime minister, and making him responsible for the choice
of his associates and subordinates.
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