Unless, therefore, the authorities
whose office it is to check the executive are backed by an effective
opinion and feeling in the country, the executive has always the means
of setting them aside, or compelling them to subservience, and is sure
to be well supported in doing so. Representative institutions
necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people
to fight for them in case of their being endangered. If too little
valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they
do, are almost sure to be overthrown, as soon as the head of the
government, or any party leader who can muster force for a coup de
main, is willing to run some small risk for absolute power.
These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in
a representative government. The third is, when the people want either
the will or the capacity to fulfil the part which belongs to them in a
representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small fraction,
feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the State
necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors will
seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their
private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one
with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small
class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the
representative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of
seeking their fortune.
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