But in this larger use of the
term, as well as in the former narrow one, Order expresses rather
one of the conditions of government, than either its purpose or the
criterion of its excellence. For the habit may be well established
of submitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to
its authority, and yet the manner in which the government deals with
those disputed matters, and with the other things about which it
concerns itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the
best from the worst possible.
If we intend to comprise in the idea of Order all that society
requires from its government which is not included in the idea of
Progress, we must define Order as the preservation of all kinds and
amounts of good which already exist, and Progress as consisting in the
increase of them. This distinction does comprehend in one or the other
section everything which a government can be required to promote. But,
thus understood, it affords no basis for a philosophy of government.
We cannot say that, in constituting a polity, certain provisions ought
to be made for Order and certain others for Progress; since the
conditions of Order, in the sense now indicated, and those of
Progress, are not opposite, but the same. The agencies which tend to
preserve the social good which already exists are the very same
which promote the increase of it, and vice versa: the sole
difference being, that a greater degree of those agencies is
required for the latter purpose than for the former.
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